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Introduction
During the last three decades, natural resource management 
policies have changed dramatically from a pure “preserva-
tionist model” or a “fences and fines” approach, to more 
decentralized approaches (Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001; Songorwa, 1999). Participation and bene-
fit sharing has been a popular strategy designed to offset 
conservation costs and motivate local people to support con-
servation (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Scherl et 
al., 2004) by aligning their behavior with conservation goals 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, Banuri, Farvar, Miller, & Philips, 
2002; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; 
Scherl et al., 2004). Many national governments, develop-
ment partners, and conservation multinationals argue for 
participatory approaches (Inamdar, De Jode, Lindsay, & 
Cobb, 1996) as they engender win−win outcomes through 
environmental management and economic development 
(Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010).
Participatory approaches have been implemented for 
about three decades, however they seem to have yielded 
mixed results (Barrett, Lee, & McPeak, 2005; Gibson & 
Marks, 1995, Newmark & Hough, 2000; Wang, Lassoie, & 
Curtis, 2006). The extent to which these approaches secure 
local people’s support for conservation may depend on the 
degree of involvement and the scale of benefits accrued 
(Child, 2003). In addition, success will depend on the 
protected area goals, objectives, methods, and mission 
(Mannigel, 2008), and the ability of protected area “manag-
ers to reconcile biodiversity conservation goals with social 
and economic issues” (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012, p. 1).
In Tanzania, the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism (MNRT) adopted locally based and decentralized 
approaches to natural resources management from the late 
1980s, following the economic crisis of the late 1970s to the 
early 1980s and the resulting declining capacity of govern-
ment agencies (Nelson & Blomley, 2010). The intention was 
to involve local people in the management of natural 
resources and for them to influence management decisions 
while benefiting directly from conservation. The two sectors, 
forests and wildlife, underwent policy reform processes in 
the 1990s. They used various techniques and approaches 
with the intention of creating good relationships through 
influencing local people’s attitudes and perceptions, to 
engender support for biodiversity conservation (Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001; Newmark & Hough, 2000). Individual 
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studies from these sectors reveal that success so far has been 
limited (e.g., Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Brockington, 
2007; Holmes, 2003; Kideghesho, 2006; Vihemäki, 2005). 
There are few studies that have closely compared the perfor-
mance of these sectors in meeting participatory objectives 
(e.g., Nelson & Blomley, 2007, 2010), although these studies 
focus more on community-based forestry and community-
based wildlife management. Studies that compare both sec-
tors by focusing on national parks and forest plantations, 
especially when they affect the same people, are lacking in 
the academic literature.
This article investigates how participatory approaches 
used by the Kilimanjaro National Park (KNP) and the West 
Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation (WKFP) influence local com-
munities’ reactions toward the study areas. KNP is managed 
by the Tanzania National Park Authority (TANAPA), while 
WKFP (60.19 km2) is managed by the Tanzania Forest 
Services Agency (TFSA)—formerly the Forest and 
Beekeeping Division (FBD). The national park was signifi-
cantly expanded in 2005 after the inclusion of a forest reserve 
(1,078 km2) that had been managed by the FBD through 
Joint Forest Management (JFM). The inclusion of the forest 
reserve was associated with changes in institutions, the legal 
framework, distribution of powers, authority, resources, and 
changes in natural resource management agents. This transi-
tion reflected substantial changes in the relationships 
between people and the State, and between people and the 
park, in terms of natural resource access and rights.
The reason for selecting these two areas is that they have 
more or less the same location and therefore concern some 
of the same local people. Both areas experienced the para-
digm shift from fortress conservation to community conser-
vation (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). According to the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
classification, KNP is classified in category II (an area man-
aged mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation) and 
WKFP is not included in the IUCN category system. 
According to Dudley (2008), forests that are commercial, 
that is timber plantation of exotic species and as such, do not 
constitute a forest protected area. Exploring the performance 
of these two areas in terms of participatory approaches can 
shed light on how they can improve the relationship with 
adjacent local communities.
The park and forest plantation involve and benefit local 
people in very different ways. At KNP the withdrawal of 
natural resources is prohibited, however the park benefits 
local people through community development projects. For 
example, park management involves local people in extin-
guishing a fire during any incident of fire outbreak in the 
park. At WKFP the management allows local people to; 
collect some forest products, participate in the logging busi-
ness (for registered customers), provide casual labor for vari-
ous activities in the plantation, and engage in farming 
activities through the taungya1 system (commonly known as 
the shamba system in East Africa). As with KNP they are 
also involved in helping during fire incidents in the forest 
plantation. This article argues that the level of participation 
and benefits applicable to the livelihoods of local people 
affect the way local communities react toward the national 
park and the forest plantation.
The next section discusses the concept of “participation,” 
followed by a description of the study area, the methods of 
data collection and the data analysis. Then the findings are 
presented before moving on to the discussions and 
conclusions.
What Is “Participation”?
The term participation is well debated and discussed in 
development and conservation literature (e.g., Agarwal, 
2001; Cleaver, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mohan & 
Stokke, 2000). The term has been used in many contexts and 
is understood in a variety of ways (e.g., Reed, 2008; Rowe, 
Marsh, & Frewer, 2004; Wilcox, 2003). In this study the term 
participation is defined following Hoben, Peters, and 
Rocheleau (1998) definition as a process through which dif-
ferent stakeholders influence, share, and keep control over 
development initiatives and over decisions and resources 
that affect them.
Local people’s participation in development and conser-
vation has enjoyed general acceptance among various actors 
in recent decades. Nevertheless, despite its acceptability, par-
ticipation in development continues to attract criticism (e.g., 
Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Diamond, Nkrumah, & Isaac, 2004; 
Hickey & Mohan, 2004). For example, some scholars who 
support the concept (e.g., Diamond et al., 2004; Mannigel, 
2008; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008) argue that participa-
tion can be used as a means (method) to promote more effi-
cient (effective, cheap) management or as an end to enhance 
equity and empowerment. Cooke and Kothari (2001), how-
ever, argue that not only is participation unable to facilitate 
meaningful social change it largely maintains existing power 
relations through masking this power behind the rhetoric and 
techniques of participation. Mohan and Stokke (2000) fur-
ther argue that participatory approaches tend to neglect local 
power relations and inequalities (as they consider local com-
munities as homogeneous entities), and underplay the role of 
broader political and economic forces.
There are several degrees of participation ranging along a 
continuum from nominal, passive, informing, giving options, 
active functional, interactive, and taking responsibility 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Diamond et al., 2004; Mannigel, 
2008; Pimbert & Pretty, 1997). When put into consideration 
the logic of “acting together” or “taking part,” the extremes 
“nominal,” “passive,” and “taking over management respon-
sibility” are not considered particularly participatory. This is 
because at those levels, local people and institutions are only 
distantly involved in management and decision-making 
activities (Mannigel, 2008, p. 500). The same author argues 
that, in rural development and in nature conservation studies, 
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the activities on these three levels are commonly referred to 
as participatory.
In terms of natural resources management, participatory 
approaches assume that, if local communities participate in 
the management of natural resources and/or benefit they will 
be more likely to support conservation (McNeely, 1995; 
Wells & Brandon, 1992). However, several studies have crit-
icized participatory approaches in natural resources manage-
ment for failing to achieve their goals in terms of devolving 
decision-making powers to and/or benefiting local people 
while promoting conservation (e.g., Barrett, Brandon, 
Gibson, & Gjertsen, 2001; Nelson, 2010; Newmark & 
Hough, 2000; Sachedina, 2008; Songorwa, 1999).
The extent to which people participate in natural resources 
management depends on the approach used by conservation 
institutions, which largely is determined by the extent of 
power sharing, in this case, between the State and commu-
nity (E. Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Pimbert & Pretty, 1997). 
Weber (1919) defines a State as the “human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory.” The same author 
notes that the State may ascribe to other institutions or to 
individuals the right to use physical force only to the extent 
to which it permits such use. For example, power can be 
ascribed to natural resources institutions to regulate access 
and control of resources, or provide rules defining the distri-
bution of benefits. Thus, the State controls the activities of 
institutions and their members through legislation, policies, 
regulations, and strategies that encompass binding rules 
(Chazan, 1994).
With regard to State and local participation in natural 
resources management in Tanzania, the government2 through 
its parliament makes official decisions concerning natural 
resources management policies, and Acts that legalize the 
management of natural resources, and participation of differ-
ent stakeholders. Different institutions under the MNRT 
manage all renewable natural resources. For instance, wild-
life resources fall under three conservation institutions: 
TANAPA that manages national parks and has its own ordi-
nance and policy; Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority 
that manages Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) and has 
its own guideline; and Wildlife Division that manages wild-
life outside national parks and NCA and has its own policy 
and guidelines. All responsible institutions for wildlife man-
agement use the Wildlife Act of 2009. However, the TFSA 
manages the forest sector and has its own Act and policy. All 
these legal documents have aspects of how local people 
should participate and benefit from natural resources.
The common participatory approaches used by these 
institutions include protected area outreach program prac-
ticed by TANAPA, community-based natural resources man-
agement practiced by Wildlife Division and TFSA, and 
co-management regimes practiced by TFSA. Tumusiime and 
Vedeld (2012) argue that success of these participatory initia-
tives may depend on the extent of involvement, amount of 
benefits accrued, and distribution. Studies elsewhere reveal 
that benefit sharing initiatives face a number of challenges 
such as corruption, lack of transparency (Cooksey, 2011; 
Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2010, 2012; Sachedina, 2008) rarely 
generate significant benefits or deliver sustainable alterna-
tive local livelihoods (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; 
Hackel, 1999). Additionally they are not always equitably 
shared within communities (West, Igoe, & Brockington, 
2006; Kiss, 2004) as illustrated in Uganda (Tumusiime & 
Vedeld, 2012), Tanzania (Kideghesho, 2006), Kenya 
(Norton-Griffiths & Said, 2010), and Madagascar (Ferraro, 
2002).
This article considers these issues in theory and in prac-
tice by exploring the case of KNP and WKFP.
Method
The Study Area
KNP is one of 15 parks in Tanzania managed by the TANAPA. 
The park was formerly known as Mount Kilimanjaro Forest 
and was protected by the German Colonial Government 
under the Forest Conservation Ordinance of 1904 (Kivumbi 
& Newmark, 1991). In 1940, it was gazetted as a forest 
reserve by the British Colonial Government under the Forest 
Ordinance of 1921 for water catchment and forest products. 
In 1941, the colonial government approved a half-mile forest 
strip (HMFS) of 0.8 km wide (area of 87.69 km2), as a buffer 
zone between the forest reserve and the more densely popu-
lated villages along the southern lower slopes of the moun-
tain. The motive was to provide local people with firewood, 
fodder, building poles, wood and non-wood products. This 
strip was managed by the local Chagga Council (Kivumbi & 
Newmark, 1991).
In 1973, the mountain above the tree line ~2700 m was 
reclassified as a national park, covering an area of 753.81 
km2. The remaining part of the forest reserve (1,078 km2) 
continued to be managed by the FBD without local participa-
tion. However their management was ineffective and led to 
continual deforestation. In response to this problem and fol-
lowing the decentralization policies in the 1990s, the New 
Forest Policy was formulated in 1998, which among other 
issues emphasized participatory management and decentral-
ization (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1998). Thus, 
FBD established Community-based Forest Management in 
which communities are managers and owners of forests, and 
JFM in which local communities co-manage forest reserves 
with central and local government authorities (URT, 1998).
Subsequently, JFM was adopted in the Kilimanjaro Forest 
Reserve with local people participating in management and 
benefiting from the reserve (Tanzania Specialist Organization 
on Community Natural Resources and Biodiversity 
Conservation [TASONABI], 2001 ). However, in September 
2005, the forest reserve and some parts of the HMFS were 
annexed to the park after the survey report that revealed 
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major threats to Mount Kilimanjaro in the form of logging, 
fires, charcoal burning, shamba (farm) practices, livestock 
grazing, forest villages (squatters), and landslides 
(Lambrechts, Woodley, Hemp, Hemp, & Nnyiti, 2002, p. 5).
Currently, the park covers an area of 1831.81 km2 
(Kilimanjaro National Park Authority [KINAPA], 2006). 
The main activities allowed in the park are non-consumptive 
tourism, education, and research. Mount Kilimanjaro 
(5,963 m altitude) is one of the major attractions in the park. 
The park borders 90 villages, all of which are included in the 
park’s outreach program. The TANAPA outreach program 
also known as Community Conservation Services (CCS) 
was initiated in 1988 with the help from the African Wildlife 
Foundation. The aim was to build good relationships between 
parks and the local communities surrounding them. The CCS 
program is based on the motto “good neighborliness” 
(Goldstein, 2005; TANAPA, 1994). The 1994 National Parks 
Policy stresses that “the outreach program will be accompa-
nied by mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of conserva-
tion are shared with local communities in appropriate ways” 
(TANAPA, 1994). The CCS was adopted in KNP in 1994 
(KINAPA, 1995).
To the north and north-west of Kilimanjaro, beneath the 
natural forest and village land, there were forest plantations 
established in 1926 and 1954 respectively, during the colo-
nial period (for timber and poles production) and expanded 
after independence in 1961. The total area of plantations to 
the north-west of Kilimanjaro (WKFP) is 60.19 km2 (Ngaga, 
2011). Of the 60.19 km2, only 44.58 km2 is covered with 
trees (TASONABI, 2001). The remaining area consists of 
catchment forest areas, steep slopes, valley bottoms, hills 
and water sources (WKFP, 2008). WKFP was established 
through the taungya system to licensed cultivators. It is 
owned by the Government of Tanzania and managed by the 
TFSA.
To incorporate the participatory aspects in WKFP after 
the Forest Policy of 1998, the plantation management in col-
laboration with FBD explored JFM opportunities 
(TASONABI, 2001). However, interviews with forest plan-
tation management revealed that the mode of operation of 
the plantation did not support JFM. In addressing the partici-
patory issues, the management objectives of the plantation 
were modified to include: the production of non-wood prod-
ucts, which are harvested by local communities; local par-
ticipation in management; and benefiting from the plantation 
(TASONABI, 2001).
Mount Kilimanjaro is characterized by a bimodal rainfall 
pattern, with long rains from March to May, and short rains 
from October to December. The rainfall varies with altitude 
and ranges from 2,300 mm at lower altitudes (the forest belt) 
to less than 200 mm at the summit (The United Nations 
Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre [UNEP-WCMC], 2009).
The Chagga are the largest ethnic group on the southern 
and eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Ethnic groups, 
such as the Maasai, the Safa, the Pare, and other small groups 
are found on the western and northern parts of the mountain. 
The slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are now occupied by more 
than one million people (Hemp, 2006). The annual popula-
tion growth rate for the Kilimanjaro region was 2.9% during 
the1988-2002 inter-censal period (Population Planning Unit, 
2005). Due to the high population density and land scarcity 
along the mountain slopes, zero-grazing is practiced by many 
people, which means that the forest is the main source of fod-
der for domestic animals.
This study was conducted in three villages, namely, 
Namwai, Engare Nairobi, and Matadi. They are located on 
the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in the Siha Division. 
These villages (former squatters) were officially registered 
by the government in the 2000s. All the villages are adjacent 
to KNP and close to WKFP. They are included in the park’s 
neighborliness list. Some members of these villages were 
evicted from the natural forest in 2006 and from the forest 
plantation in 2007. The population of the three villages was 
23,411 in 2009. The main economic activities are small-scale 
farming, small-scale livestock keeping, small-scale business, 
timber/log business, casual labor in plantations, formal 
employment, and a few villagers assisting tourists as porters. 
Many villagers practice the taungya system in the forest 
plantation (Figure 1).
Data Collection and Analysis
Empirical data was collected during different periods 
between 2009 and 2012 (8 months of field work in total). 
Initially, the study sought to investigate the KNP outreach 
program and therefore first interviewees were purposefully 
selected such as village government leaders, villagers (males 
and females aged 18 years old and above), the park’s out-
reach warden, the park’s protection warden, and tourist por-
ters. The local people who were interviewed reported a 
negative relationship with the park and indicated the forest 
plantation as a good neighbor. This observation prompted to 
study theparticipatory approaches and benefit sharing 
schemes used by the KNP and WKFP. In the follow-up field-
work villagers, village government leaders, the forest planta-
tion manager, forest plantation staff, former forest reserve 
staff, and former village natural resources committee mem-
bers were purposefully selected and interviewed. The inter-
views were qualitative, semi-structured, prepared specifically 
for the interviewees, and conducted in Swahili, i.e. a lan-
guage understood by most of the people in the study area.
A total number of 68 people (37 men and 31 women) were 
interviewed in this study. The interview sessions lasted 
between 1 and 2 hr each. Saturation point was reached when 
consequent interviews revealed no new information regard-
ing the study topic. Interviews were supplemented with 
informal discussions with different people, participant obser-
vation, and focus group discussions with 6 to 10 people in 
each study village. In addition, the researcher attended the 
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village assembly at Engare Nairobi village, and reviewed rel-
evant literature and several studies conducted in the area. On 
this basis a lot was learned on how local communities are 
involved and benefit from each area.
Each interview began by informing the interviewees about 
the research project and seeking their consent to participate in 
the study. The participants were encouraged to express them-
selves freely, and were guaranteed anonymity and confidenti-
ality. A notebook was used to record information from the 
interviewees, and when permission was granted a tape 
recorder was used to record data, which was later transcribed. 
The collected data was analyzed by identifying themes and 
patterns, organizing them into coherent categories, and link-
ing them to the aims of the study. In addition, statements were 
written that could be supported by appropriate illustrative 
quotes from the interviews to explain each theme.
Results
The analysis of field data revealed five main themes: the pro-
cess of expansion of KNP, access to natural resources after 
inclusion of the forest reserve in the park, local people par-
ticipation in managing the KNP and WKFP, benefit sharing 
schemes, and the relationship between local communities, 
KNP and WKFP. A description and discussion of each theme 
is in the following sections and a comparison summary of the 
KNP and WKFP is presented in Table 1.
The Process of Expansion of the KNP
As elaborated in the “Method” section, the Kilimanjaro Forest 
Reserve and some parts of the HMFS were annexed to KNP in 
2005 after Lambrechts et al. (2002) revealed major threats to 
Mount Kilimanjaro. However, the analysis of field data reveals 
that KNP did not fully involve local people during the inclu-
sion of the forest reserve into the park. As one interviewee 
stated, “the park officials did not conduct any meeting with us; 
they passed in some households and took some individuals’ 
opinions and then considered these as the opinions of all vil-
lagers; something which is false” (Interview no. 7, 2011). The 
process was not clear about changes in user rights, restrictions 
on entry to the forest, and access to forest resources.
Figure 1. Overview map showing study villages, Kilimanjaro National Park, and the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation.
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The park demarcated the area without the local people’s 
involvement, and unfortunately included portions of people’s 
farmland into the park boundaries. This intensified the con-
flict, which was later resolved by positioning some beacons 
in cooperation with villagers and district officials (Interview 
no. 7, 2011). The park did not consider the provision of a 
buffer zone where communities could harvest forest prod-
ucts (Interview no. 9, 2011). Furthermore, the park manage-
ment dissolved the village natural resources committee and 
decided to handle all matters of park management without 
the participation of local people (Interview no. 8, 2009). 
Whilst the process of expansion of the KNP annexed only the 
Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve, the WKFP continued to be man-
aged by FBD under the same objectives as before (Interview, 
Natural Resource Officer, 2012).
Access to Natural Resources After Inclusion of 
the Forest Reserve in the Park
After the forest reserve was annexed to KNP, entry or har-
vesting any natural products from the park without permis-
sion is considered to be illegal. The park is patrolled by park 
rangers. Some women who entered the park illegally 
reported being raped, sexually harassed, or had their prop-
erty confiscated. Likewise, men reported instances of being 
arrested, beaten, and prosecuted (Interview no. 12, 2011). 
Furthermore, restrictions have even been imposed on 
searching for lost children or livestock in the forest. 
The park staff demands that villagers must wait for them to 
come before entering the forest, and in most cases, their 
response is not timely (Interview no. 19, 2009). The lack of 
cooperation in handling illegal activities in the park seemed 
to tarnish the image of the villages and negatively affect 
their fund application for development projects as the park 
management demands that villages should abstain from ille-
gal activities. Villagers describe this system as “arrest and 
send” (kamata peleka; Interview nos. 20 & 21, 2009). Those 
who were caught in the forest were mainly: collectors of 
firewood, fodder, poles, and plants for traditional medicine; 
traditional hunters; farmers (cannabis); and timber splitters 
(Interview no. 22, 2009). However, the Park Rangers seemed 
to respect permits stamped by village governments and 
issued to plumbers working on irrigation canals (Interview 
no. 26, 2009).
Table 1. Summary of the park and the forest plantation’s participatory approaches.
KNP WKFP
Administration •• TANAPA •• TFSA (formerly managed by FBD)
Participatory approach •• Outreach program–sharing up to 7.5% of 
park’s operational budget
•• Participate in various activities in the 
plantation—Casual labor, farming 
opportunities, provision of logs for community 
projects, purchase logs (registered customers), 
in-kind benefits.
Criteria and procedures •• Cumbersome and complex, bureaucratic, 
top-down, sometimes politically influenced
•• Easy to follow, but sometimes affected by 
favoritism
Benefits •• Only one of the study villages supported in 
2002/2003
•• Access to forest products
•• Payment from casual labor, farming 
opportunities (for food and cash); logging 
business, logs provision for development 
projects.
Participation in management •• Fire extinguishing •• Fire extinguishing,
•• Planting trees, tending trees, various activities 
through casual labor
Costs of conservation •• Crop raiding; no access to natural resources; 
punishment, harassment, death, rape, fines or 
court cases
•• Crop raiding
Shortcomings •• No communication; no decision-making 
power; top-down approach; no buffer zone; 
Minimal/no benefits,
•• No decision making; top-down approach; 
favoritism
Relationship •• Negative relationship—Hatred, resentment, 
illegal access of resources, referred to as an 
“enemy”
•• Positive relationship—Referred to as a “savior”
Local people’s desirable condition •• To have share of park revenues
•• To have some extent of decision making over 
forest conservation
•• Payment in case of fire if cannot harvest 
resources, and have buffer zone
•• Be assisted to form groups and participate in 
benefit deals (logs)
•• Benefit through income from sold trees
•• Join hands in plantation management
Note. KNP = Kilimanjaro National Park; WKFP = West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation; TANAPA = Tanzania National Park Authority; TFSA = Tanzania 
Forest Services Agency; FBD = Forest and Beekeeping Division.
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Based on restrictions imposed by the park, villagers 
reported that WKFP is the main hope for their livelihoods. 
One interviewee stated, “. . . without this forest plantation, 
people could not live here, they would have vacated. . .” 
(Interview no. 2, 2009). Villages and nearby towns depend 
on the plantation for their firewood needs. The local people 
are allowed to collect firewood during thinning and harvest-
ing periods. Fodder harvesting is also allowed, if it does not 
take place at water sources. Moreover, people purchase con-
struction poles, participate in the logging business (for regis-
tered customers), and are involved in farming opportunities 
in the plantation, and seasonal employment.
The Involvement of Local People in Managing the 
Park and the Plantation
At KNP local people are involved in park management 
through fire extinguishing exercises. However, they are not 
allowed to enter the park before the park rangers arrive. It is 
worth noting that fire extinguishing is on a voluntary basis; 
thus, no payment or incentive is given other than food. The 
villagers claimed that in such exercises they work as a team 
with park officials and, thereafter, the relationship ends 
(Interview no. 2, 2009; Interview no. 1, 2011). As the park 
rangers are paid for fire extinguishing duty the local people 
feel that they should also be paid, since they do not have any 
share in the forest (Interview no. 4, 2009). To emphasize the 
situation, the villagers claimed that the park recognizes them 
only in the event of catastrophes (Interview no. 4, 2009). 
Such a relationship has caused many people to turn away 
from cooperating with the park because they do not regard 
themselves as stakeholders in the management of the forest. 
The local people compare the current management of the for-
est reserve with the former management under the FBD, as 
one village leader asserted,
In those days, many people turned up to extinguish fire because 
they knew the reserve belonged to them, . . . but now we have to 
convince and force them because they are not paid and do not 
benefit from the park. (Interview no. 5, 2011)
At WKFP the situation is different. The plantation man-
agement has created awareness in the surrounding villages 
about conservation, fire control, and prevention measures. In 
cases of fire outbreaks the communities react quickly to 
extinguish the fire and do not demand payment (Interview 
WKFP, 2012). However, some interviewees revealed that the 
WKFP structure is rigid and they lack participation in deci-
sion making. The following section describes the benefit 
sharing schemes used by KNP and WKFP.
Benefit Sharing Schemes
Criteria and procedures. The benefit sharing scheme of the 
CCS involves support for community-initiated projects 
(SCIP), conservation education, and income generating proj-
ects. SCIP was initiated in 1992 to support social projects of 
villages bordering or close to national parks (Goldstein, 
2005).
To obtain support from the park, KNP’s neighboring vil-
lages have to comply with a set of criteria. These criteria 
include: the village should be free from poaching; it should 
not have previously been supported by the park; conserva-
tion education has been provided; the village is in close prox-
imity to the park; and the project should be of importance to 
the community (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). However, the inter-
views revealed that most of the studied villages lack aware-
ness about the criteria used for selecting projects for support. 
The main criterion known by villagers was “proximity to the 
park,” which they defined as having a “patch of natural for-
est” bordering the park. There was generally a lack of aware-
ness on park matters because the park has not conducted any 
meeting in the study villages.
Apart from the criteria, there are established procedures 
to follow that include holding a village assembly to select a 
project, submitting minutes of the meeting, and presenting 
an application letter outlining the reason for the request, the 
amount requested, project description, drawings and cost 
estimates, while being able to meet about 30% of the project 
costs (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). The district authorities must 
be involved in these procedures, and the SCIP committee 
should approve the project before it is forwarded to national 
parks headquarters to be considered for funding. Before proj-
ect implementation a memorandum of understanding has to 
be signed between the community, the park and district 
authorities (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). The interviews revealed 
that some of these procedures are known by village govern-
ment, however they are rarely followed because they are 
bureaucratic and top-down. In most cases district level offi-
cials initiate the procedures rather than the communities in 
need. For instance, applications for construction of water 
intake and a water storage tank in Matadi village, as well as 
a secondary school library in Namwai village, were initially 
negotiated between the District Commissioner and KNP 
before the villages were involved. Other procedures were not 
followed (Interview nos. 27, 28, & 50, 2009). Moreover 
KNP has only one Park Outreach Warden who has a large 
workload in visiting 90 villages and consequently has insuf-
ficient time to assist villagers with any SCIP applications.
At WKFP the criteria for benefiting includes closeness to 
the plantation, and the criteria for the allocation of taungya 
plots include: health-related aspects (e.g. long periods of 
sickness, HIV/AIDS affected persons), age-related factors 
(e.g. elderly people), orphans, widows, poor people, planta-
tion staff, and casual laborers who work in the plantation.3 
The local people in need of plots register their names with 
the respective hamlet leaders. In some instances HIV/AIDs 
affected persons, disabled and widows go directly to the 
plantation management to seek further attention. No fee is 
required to acquire a plot (cf. Dean, 2011).
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As in the case of KNP, at WKFP the process also has some 
weaknesses. The interview responses revealed some aspects 
of favoritism in the process of plot allocation. First, the vil-
lage leadership registered the names of villagers according to 
the set criteria, however the plots were allocated to other per-
sons. Even though plantation management sometimes cross 
checked the process the problem remained in some villages, 
as one widow lamented:
I have been to plantation headquarters and in our village 
government office for more than 4 times applying for a plot. I 
was given a promise but during the plot allocation exercise, my 
name was not in the list . . . I am tired; I have lost hope. (Interview 
no. 42, 2012)
Second, some villagers reported that the management in 
the forest plantation favors relatives, friends, or influential 
people in the community during the allocation of plots; and 
some staff engage in corruption by allocating plots to them-
selves where they later sell the user rights,rent out, or give to 
relatives or friends.
Benefit sharing. KNP does not share monetary benefits with 
local communities. Instead it benefits local communities 
through SCIP. During implementation of these projects the 
park contributes up to 70% of the project costs and the com-
munity contributes the remaining 30%. Although KNP is not 
the most visited national park in Tanzania, it ranks number 
one in terms of generating revenue. It generates about 38% 
of the total revenue of Tanzania National Parks, followed by 
the Serengeti National Park (33%; Kessy, n.d.).This is 
because tourists stay in the park longer (while climbing 
Mount Kilimanjaro) than those visiting the other national 
parks in the northern tourist circuit. Tourists spend money on 
accommodation, transport, food, and souvenirs. The infor-
mation from the Tourism Department shows that from 2002 
to 2008 KNP generated about 102.1M US$ (about 17M US$ 
per year).
The revenues collected from KNP and other parks go to 
the National Park's headquarters where the “park’s opera-
tional budget” is allocated. Only 7.5% of the budget goes 
to communities for SCIP. From its inception in 1994 to 
2011 (17 years) the KNP’s CCS Department has spent 
only about 1.6M US$ to support 39 out of 90 villages 
neighboring the park. The types of social projects sup-
ported include: construction of public schools and pur-
chase of furniture; construction of cattle troughs, cattle 
dips, water tanks, bridges, dispensaries and staff houses; 
making energy saving stoves; establishing tree nurseries; 
beekeeping projects and women’s sewing projects. The 
information from National Parks headquarters shows that 
in 2007 they earned 56.3M US$, of which only about 1M 
US$ (1.8%) was allocated to 15 national parks for out-
reach program activities (TANAPA, 2007, cited in 
Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2008).
In the study villages only Matadi village was supported in 
2002/2003 to construct a water intake and storage tank worth 
approximately 13,571 US$. In 2008 the village applied for 
support to complete a student hostel project, however it was 
not considered by the CCS Department (Interview no. 34, 
2009). According to the CCS Warden, the department does 
not prioritize projects that had already started claiming that 
'they do not know their quality'. The village leadership 
reported that the outreach department did not take any initia-
tive to evaluate whether the building project was worthy of 
support. Similarly, Namwai village applied for support to 
construct a secondary school library. However, the applica-
tion was unsuccessful as the park claimed that it faced finan-
cial constraints (Interview CCS Warden, 2011). From the 
time of application in 2009 to August 2011, the communities 
had not been informed about the park’s decision on their 
applications. This was a second attempt for Namwai village 
who had applied in 2005/2006 for support to construct a dis-
pensary also without success (Interview no. 28, 2009). Some 
interviewees stated that they have lost hope in requesting 
help from the park.
The analysis of revenue sharing data from the CCS 
Department from 1994 to 2011 shows that Moshi Rural 
District had received the most funds (556,940 US$), fol-
lowed closely by Moshi Urban District (455,453 US$). 
Although Moshi Urban District does not border the park or 
directly bear the costs of conservation, it had received more 
funds than other districts that do directly bear the costs of 
conservation. A good example is Rombo District who had 
received about half (272,727 US$) of what Moshi Urban 
District had received. In 2008/2009, Moshi Urban District 
received more than half (169,080 US$) of the total SCIP 
funds (321,781 US$) allocated for that year. Most of these 
funds (148,200 US$) supported a private catholic secondary 
school.
Nyeme and Nilsen (2010) point out another example in 
which 72% of SCIP funds in 2007/2008 were given to 
Mwanga District that does not border the park. This was 
made possible through the then MNRT Minister, who was 
also a Member of Parliament for that district (Nyeme & 
Nilsen, 2010). Not only does the deviation of revenues to 
other areas adversely affect the benefits for park neighbors, 
the revenue from the higher earning parks, such as KNP, sup-
ports lower earning parks. Furthermore, mishandling and 
mismanagement of revenues received by the National Park's 
headquarters also adversely affects benefit sharing schemes. 
For example, in 2009 the Opposition in Parliament sought a 
detailed explanation on the reported misuse of about 5.6M 
US$ by National Park's headquarters (Juma, 2009). In addi-
tion, after their 3-year term, the 12 Board of Trustee Directors 
each received a lump sum of money (Anonymous, 2006). 
Recent criticism of the National Parks headquarters has led 
the former Director General to resign.
At WKFP local communities benefit from the forest plan-
tation through forest products such as logs (for registered 
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customers), fodder, firewood, construction poles (during 
thinning), farming opportunities, and casual labor. Logs are 
sold to registered customers from the Kilimanjaro region, the 
Arusha region, and some as far away as Kenya. From 2010 
to 2012 the number of customers ranged from 35 to 37 
(11 customers in 2012 were from the study villages). The 
public institutions and the plantation’s neighbors purchase 
logs mainly for construction purposes. For instance, in 
2012/2013, 1,000 m3 of logs were sold to the plantation’s 
neighbors. From 2008/2009 to 2012/2013, the logs and poles 
products ranged between 14,000 and 21,000 m3.
The fee for softwood logs ranges from 1.7 to 32 US$/m3 
depending on diameter, length and species type. Softwood 
poles are sold at between 0.13 and 0.64 US$ depending on 
the diameter and length. This revenue belongs to the govern-
ment. Customers are also charged 7 US$/m3 for softwood 
logs for silvicultural activities and road maintenance in the 
plantation. This revenue is deposited into the Logging 
Miscellaneous Account, managed by the forest plantation.
The forest plantation does not sell logs to community 
groups because second and third pruning and tree felling 
activities are conducted by the customers themselves. Often, 
community groups deny responsibility when these activities 
are conducted improperly. Villages in need of logs for social 
development activities obtain them from the forest plantation 
after seeking permission from TFSA. For individual con-
struction purposes the villagers are expected to purchase tim-
ber from sawmills (Interview WKFP, 2012).
Villagers benefit through casual labor by participating in 
various activities that take place in the plantation. For exam-
ple, during the tree planting season people from the sur-
rounding villages, and from further afield, are involved. 
They are usually paid 2.5 US$/day and the exercise can take 
up to a month. The villagers also participate in security activ-
ities. There are 19 men and 1 woman from the neighboring 
villages of Matadi, Engare Nairobi, and Namwai who have 
been used as security guards in the plantation. Casual labor is 
also needed to water the seedlings planted in the nurseries. 
For this exercise the plantation management considers neigh-
boring villages because people are needed to work on a daily 
basis and whenever such labor is required. The local people, 
mainly men, are also involved in the construction and main-
tenance of plantation roads. In the years 2009/2010, 
2010/2011, and 2011/2012, the forest plantation manage-
ment paid 78,321, 73,030, and 77,919 US$ respectively to 
casual laborers for various activities in the forest plantation. 
Other benefits associated with the forest plantation include 
offering transport during sickness and burial ceremony when 
the need arises.
The forest plantation also provides farming plots to local 
people. The availability of plots depends on the extent of 
land available after tree harvesting. Plots vary in size from 
30 × 30 m, 30 × 40 m, 40 × 40 m, and 50 × 50 m. Those who 
cannot cultivate their plots and those in need of immediate 
money sell their plots to rich farmers, while some agree with 
others to cultivate the plots on their behalf sharing what is 
harvested between them. However, such arrangements are 
usually outside of plantation management control.
Small-scale farmers own one to two plots, while large-
scale farmers may own up to 20 plots. Small-scale farmers 
and persons who do not have plots are sometimes hired by 
large-scale farmers. The small-scale farmers manage to 
attend their own plots by setting aside time before or after 
working as casual laborers for the large-scale farmers. 
Farming is ongoing throughout the year with the main crops 
being potatoes, carrots and garden peas and the output from 
one plot varies from 5 to 20 sacks. Tree species determine the 
length of time a farmer can use the plot. For instance, in plots 
growing eucalyptus species a farmer could cultivate crops 
for 2 to 3 years. In plots with pines and cyprus species a 
farmer could cultivate for up to 4 years, while in less fertile 
areas the time could be extended up to 5 years.
Overall, the taungya system has benefited many people 
by providing food, cash and employment opportunities. As 
one man stated,“. . . through the taungya system many peo-
ple have become rich . . . large-scale farmers earn about 
28,000 US$ per one farming season”4 (Interview no. 15, 
October 2011). However, the local people do not have any 
security in terms of the land. In case of destruction of tree 
species, the right to use the land could be terminated and 
there is no assurance of plot allocation in the future after the 
first allocation expires (cf. Dean, 2011). Besides, most per-
sons interviewed expressed fear and insecurity about their 
livelihoods in the future. They are concerned that if planta-
tion management should change or the plantation is priva-
tized (accompanied by different policies) they may no longer 
have permission to use the land.
The Relationship Between Local Communities, 
the Park, and the Forest Plantation
It is beyond doubt that local people depend on KNP for their 
livelihood needs, as one interviewee stated, “We want to get 
our immediate needs like firewood and fodder first before 
development projects . . .” (Interview no. 31, 2011). The lack 
of alternatives for their livelihoods results in illegal with-
drawal of natural resources from the forest, as one inter-
viewee remarked:
. . . is it possible for a poor person to live next to the forest 
without a buffer zone and watch the forest without extraction of 
any resource? . . . it is obvious that extraction will occur illegally 
. . . (Interview no. 9, 2011)
Resentment and hatred toward the park have led people to 
enter the forest and withdraw natural resources, including 
green wood, as one interviewee stated,
They have taken the forest, no entry, no access to forest 
resources, and there is no buffer zone . . . it is a big problem . . . 
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the park has a difficult task to control us from withdrawing the 
forest products, and we have a job of watching them—when 
they leave we must harvest the resources . . . since we are not 
free to access the resources, we do things we were not doing 
when the forest was under FBD. (Interview no. 24, 2009)
The village government leader asserted,
 . . . We cannot convince villagers to stop illegal activities. We 
have to keep quiet because it is not our property. If villagers 
benefit from it, they become guards, but now the park restricts 
us from entering the forest . . . If someone enters with a saw, will 
you arrest such a person? The forest is the way it is today 
because we took good care of it. (Interview no. 18, 2011)
The costs of conservation, such as crop raiding and lack 
of compensation, also contribute to resentment toward the 
park, as one interviewee stated, “Wild animals destroy our 
crops so much. If you dare to say or complain they tell you, 
you are living in a wildlife corridor. We are not allowed to 
kill them or beat them” (Interview no. 18, 2010).
Furthermore, there is a lack of communication between 
the park and the people as one interviewee stated, “KNP 
works like military army ". . . there is no communication. We 
don’t know what is going on inside . . . ” (Interview no. 45, 
2011). These voices imply that the relationship between the 
park management and the local people is poor.
Management at WKFP reported that the relationship with 
local communities is good. Confirming this, many people 
interviewed stated that the forest plantation is a “savior” and 
a “true neighbor” who cares for their livelihood needs and 
the less privileged in the community. However, some inter-
viewees reported instances of favoritism from community 
and plantation management during the allocation of farming 
plots.
Comparison of the Park’s and the 
Forest Plantation’s Participatory 
Approaches
The results presented above illustrate the process of the 
expansion of KNP and its impacts on local people, and dif-
ferent strategies used by KNP and WKFP to involve and ben-
efit local people. However, the performance of the two areas 
is different despite the fact that they fall under the same min-
istry. In the following section, I elaborate on the underlying 
factors contributing to the differences.
Legal Framework
The performance of KNP and WKFP is partly affected by 
sectoral policies and legislation. The legal documents spec-
ify the manner in which local participation and benefit shar-
ing should occur in terms of natural resources management. 
However, this study found that the local participation and 
benefit sharing strategy used by KNP is more rhetoric than 
reality. In practice, the park operates closely under the 
“fences and fines” strategy. The park’s approach does not 
consider the needs of local people and, to a large extent, is a 
trade-off where tourism and conservation goals are met at the 
expense of local persons livelihood needs. At WKFP the per-
formance of the plantation clearly reflects a win–win situa-
tion where plantation goals, government benefits and local 
persons needs are met.
As previously stated, KNP is classified in category II by 
IUCN while WKFP does not fall under any IUCN category. 
While this may partly explain the difference in the extent of 
natural resource access by local people in each area, much is 
left to consider in terms of benefit sharing, participation in 
decision making, and management of the two areas. 
Therefore, these aspects are elaborated further below.
Benefit Sharing
Given the KNP’s high income levels one would expect more 
benefit sharing and well established relationships with local 
people. However, this study finds that several factors have 
shaped the benefit sharing scheme. Firstly, National Park's 
headquarters applies a set of criteria and procedures for SCIP 
application, which are bureaucratic, complex, and lacking 
transparency (cf. E. G. C. Barrow, Gichohi, & Infield, 2000). 
It is difficult for local communities to follow the required 
procedures and in most cases education or assistance is 
required, particularly for illiterate groups.
Secondly, the bulk of collected revenues from all national 
parks in Tanzania is remitted to National Park's headquarters. 
Headquarters channel the operational budget to national 
parks and only up to 7.5% of its operational budget is set 
aside for outreach programs to surrounding villages that bear 
the cost of conservation (see Goldstein, 2005). This system is 
different from other countries like Uganda and Kenya where 
revenue for local people is derived directly from tourists’ 
entry fees (e.g. Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012).
Thirdly, external political influence affects benefit shar-
ing with funds being diverted to areas not directly affected by 
the park. Moreover, SCIP applications are sometimes influ-
enced by district level leaders for political gain and credit 
(Borgerhoff Mulder, Caro, & Msago, 2007).
Fourthly, the mismanagement and misuse of funds by 
National Park's headquarter officials adversely affects the 
benefits for local people and the amount of revenue left for 
park outreach programs. Inappropriate leakages and corrup-
tion in the wildlife sector have previously been reported 
(e.g., Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Benjaminsen & 
Svarstad, 2010; Cooksey, 2011; Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2009, 
2010, 2012; Sachedina, 2008).
Contrary to the KNP benefit sharing scheme, WKFP has 
had a more positive impact on neighboring villages. Local 
communities benefit through; the logs business (for regis-
tered customers), collection of forest products, engaging in 
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income-producing casual labor activities, and the taungya 
system. The demand for (fertile) agricultural land has been 
met, to some extent, through the plantation’s taungya sys-
tem. The application criteria for taungya plots are much sim-
pler than the KNP’s criteria and guidelines for SCIP 
application. Since the inclusion of the forest into KNP, the 
need for forest products has been partly met by the forest 
plantation. However, the only type of employment offered is 
casual labor and casual laborers are paid very little. 
Communities have opted to accept low pay because they lack 
alternatives and working for the plantation increases their 
chance of obtaining farming plots. Unfortunately, the alloca-
tion of plots has been adversely affected by favoritism. 
Similar cases of favoritism in taungya system have also been 
reported in Ghana (Agyeman et al., 2003).
Participation in the Management of the Park and 
the Forest Plantation
KNP focuses strictly on its structure and has no consider-
ation to local persons contributions toward conservation. 
There is no local community member that plays an active 
role in park administration or temporary employment. The 
park considers local people only when there is a fire out-
break; thus, local people claim that they are used as “tools.” 
As a result few turn up to help with fire incidents while oth-
ers demand payment. KNP’s exclusion of local people from 
park management contributes to the negative relationship 
that exists between the park and the people. Paraskevopoulos, 
Korfiatis, and Pantis (2003) found that social exclusion neg-
atively affects conservation attitudes. WKFP does involve 
local people in plantation management through different 
activities, and has created positive interaction with sur-
rounding communities. In this case local people participate 
willingly to help with fire incidents. However, in both areas 
participation is used as a means to improve efficiency in 
production and/or conservation. Both areas operate on the 
lowest level of the “participation ladder,” although the par-
ticipation level of WKFP seems to be higher than that of 
KNP. Many of KNP failures/shortcomings coincide with 
other protective management studies elsewhere where focus 
is on structural barriers toward successful public participa-
tion (e.g., Lachapelle, McCool, & Patterson, 2003; Wilson, 
2003).
Participation in Decision Making
KNP and WKFP share a centralized structure in terms of 
decision making on matters pertaining to the management of 
natural resources and benefit sharing. It is difficult for com-
munities to influence or challenge the operation of the cen-
tral structure. The park management system does not allow 
space for local people’s opinions because of its top-down and 
paramilitary nature. This was revealed during the inclusion 
of the forest reserve into the park, as there was no awareness 
raising or sensitization about changes of user rights and 
hence the process took people by surprise (see Lerkelund, 
2011). In addition, only district leaders who make decisions 
have been involved in choosing development projects for 
support (cf. Borgerhoff Mulder et al., 2007; Durrant, 2004). 
There has not been any opportunity for villagers to contrib-
ute to the park’s planning and decision-making processes nor 
has there been dialogue with park staff to express their prob-
lems and seek solutions (cf. Anthony, 2007; E. G. C. Barrow 
et al., 2000). Moreover, most of the revenue collected has 
been retained by the National Park's headquarters and local 
people have no power or influence over its allocation.
In the case of WKFP, local persons have no power or share 
in the revenue collected from logs and poles sold, apart from 
payments received for casual labor (cf. Agyeman et al., 2003; 
Amoah, 2009). Additionally, they have no influence over the 
amount paid for casual labor, nor do they receive any incen-
tive for tending trees. The income from logs sold is remitted 
to the central government. Although local people in the forest 
plantation are viewed as beneficiaries, they are not involved 
in decision making over forest use (cf. Alden Wily, 2002). 
Gillingham and Lee (1999) point out that the lack of partici-
pation in decision making shapes local persons perceptions of 
protected areas and affects their relationships with govern-
ment conservation institutions and other stakeholders. 
Andrade and Rhodes (2012) found that local community par-
ticipation in the protected area decision-making process is 
significantly related to the level of compliance with protected 
area polices. Silori’s (2006) study in India found that lack of 
involvement of the local people in the decision-making pro-
cesses and in forest management groups were major causes of 
negative attitudes toward protected areas.
Communication and Awareness
There is generally a lack of communication between KNP 
and villagers. There has not been any awareness raising 
activities to increase public awareness and participation in 
conservation efforts. Local persons mainly experience the 
negative side of the relationship with the park through fines, 
imprisonment, and restrictions (cf. Durrant, 2004). This lack 
of communication and conservation awareness about the 
park’s objectives and mission may contribute to the negative 
relationship between the park and local persons. Holmes’s 
(2003) study in western Tanzania found that the number of 
visits of national parks personnel to the village was associ-
ated with positive attitudes. Fiallo and Jacobson’s (1995) 
study in Ecuador found that low level of awareness regarding 
conservation issues was associated with negative attitudes 
toward protected areas. Nevertheless, Heinen and Shrivastava 
(2009) found that higher level of awareness on regulations 
was associated with negative attitudes toward conservation. 
Contrary to KNP, the WKFP plantation staff visit villages 
and raise awareness about environmental issues and fire con-
trol measures.
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Relationship
Some studies argue that the fear of law enforcement officials 
reduces anti-conservation behavior (e.g., Aipanjiguly & 
Jacobson, 2002). However, this study found that people are 
engaged in illegal withdrawal of resources from the park 
regardless of patrols by park rangers for the following rea-
sons: lack of, or very few benefits; denial of access to natural 
resources; lack of buffer zones to harvest natural resources; 
ill-treatment when found in the park; and lack of compensa-
tion for crop raiding. In addition, villagers referred to the 
park staff as “enemies” who do not care about their liveli-
hoods (cf. Anthony, 2007). Given the fact that land is a scarce 
resource in villages surrounding the park (see Hemp, 2006), 
dependence on the park's natural resources for livelihood 
needs is unavoidable. Silori’s (2006) study in India found 
that restricted access to forest resources for local persons 
livelihood needs resulted in negative attitudes among them 
toward the biosphere reserve. Similarly, Arjunan, Holmes, 
Puyravaud, and Davidar (2006) found that exclusion of peo-
ple from a forest to protect biodiversity often antagonizes 
local communities.
While local communities bear the costs of conservation 
they do not receive any tangible benefits to offset these costs 
(cf. Kideghesho, 2006). In addition, the target of benefits 
from the park is not immediate nor does it address felt needs. 
The scheme tends to focus on infrastructure, which remains 
the only testimony of support provided (Redford & Fearn, 
2007). Similar findings have been reported by Holmes (2003) 
in western Tanzania, revealing that individuals who perceived 
active extension services from national parks held more posi-
tive attitudes toward the park than those who did not.
At WKFP benefits obtained by the local people seem to 
affect the relationship positively. This is revealed through 
local persons responses in cases of fire outbreaks, during tree 
planting activities and their corresponding attitude toward 
plantation staff. In cases of fire outbreaks, their responses are 
quick and they do not demand payment. The community 
regards the forest plantation as a “savior” as far as their live-
lihoods are concerned. This is because the plantation is the 
main alternative for their livelihoods since the inclusion of 
the forest reserve into the park.
Why Do the Park and the Forest Plantation 
Perform Differently?
The findings and explanation given above show that KNP 
offers limited opportunities for local people to participate 
and benefit from natural resources, compared with WKFP. 
The difference observed is related to the legal framework 
reforms that took place in the 1990s following the country’s 
economic crisis in the 1980s and the loss of resources and 
declining capacity of the central government. Institutional 
changes in both sectors (forestry and wildlife) have contin-
ued since the 1990s, however they have not necessarily been 
in ways proposed or intended by local proponents of reforms 
and/or donors (Nelson & Blomley, 2010). The reforms have 
faced resistance due to the interests and incentives that politi-
cal elites, central agencies, and private commercial interests 
pose for expanding and/or maintaining control over land and 
natural resources (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). Consequently, 
reforms were not carried out as intended because competing 
state and private commercial interests considered the 
resources “too valuable to allow ordinary citizens to own” 
(Alden Wily, 2008, p. 4).
According to Nelson and Blomley (2010), the economic 
crisis of the1980s prompted policy makers to implement 
wide-ranging policy changes that were more community-
based and decentralized. The process of policy formulation 
was dominated by international donors, NGOs, technical 
advisors, and government officials within the MNRT. The 
same authors argue that, in the forestry sector, donors man-
aged to leverage the process due to FBD’s lack of alternative 
sources of political power and financial capital. Nevertheless, 
in the wildlife sector, donors had very little influence due to 
the ability of policy makers to acquire rents from tourism 
that provided them with financial assets that enabled them to 
deflect reform pressure from donors (Nelson & Blomley, 
2010). Consequently, donors failed to bring about the reforms 
necessary for positive and direct impacts on rural livelihoods 
(Nelson & Blomley, 2010).
Although the two sectors are under the same ministry, the 
existing legal framework causes them to work in different 
directions indicating that the outputs might be different in 
terms of participation levels and benefits channeled to local 
communities. Blomley and Iddi (2009) conclude that the 
“legal uncertainty caused by the parallel and disconnected 
development of wildlife and forest policies and laws results 
in inefficiencies and wasted opportunities for poverty reduc-
tion and sustainable land [natural resources] management” 
(p. 18).
Conclusions and Recommendations
This article has presented findings on participatory 
approaches used by a national park and a forest plantation in 
Tanzania. How the park and plantation work and how they 
affect the relationship with local people and the resulting 
attitudes toward the study areas has been presented. 
Conservationists, government officials, and development 
partners have presented the notion of participatory approaches 
as a “win−win” strategy where conservation and local bene-
fits can be combined. Many conservation institutions have 
used this strategy to win local people’s support for conserva-
tion. However, this study shows that although some aspects 
of participatory approaches seem to be typical in KNP, it is 
evident that the park operates closely under the “fences and 
fines” strategy. This is contrary to the other case of WKFP 
where local people are involved and benefit through various 
activities in the forest plantation. In both cases, we have seen 
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that the extent of local participation and the amount of ben-
efits accrued seem to determine the communities’ relation-
ship with the study areas.
Many factors affect the level of participation and extent of 
benefits for local people, which can be summarized as fol-
lows. At KNP the factors include bureaucratic procedures for 
SCIP applications; lack of, or few benefits; lack of transpar-
ency; deviation of funds; lack of decision making; minimal/
passive participation; and lack of communication and aware-
ness. At WKFP, the factors include lack of decision making, 
too little payment for casual labor, corruption in allocating 
taungya plots, and lack of revenue sharing from logs sold. 
This article highlights that the differences observed between 
the park and forest plantation are related to sectoral legal 
reforms that occurred in the 1990s following the economic 
crisis of the 1980s.
Some issues were raised in the interviews (Table 1) that 
the management of the KNP and WKFP can consider to 
enhance positive relationships and thus reduce the costs of 
conservation. In the case of KNP local people desire regular 
positive communication with park staff, tangible benefits 
from the park’s tourism revenues, and some degree of deci-
sion making over park conservation issues. They also seek 
payment in case of fire, if they cannot harvest natural 
resources, and a buffer zone in which they can collect natural 
resources. At WKFP local people desire the plantation man-
agement to allow community groups to participate in logging 
business deals, to benefit in the form of income from logs and 
poles sold, and join hands in the plantation management.
The findings of this article show the failure of the park’s 
participatory approach to create good relationship with adja-
cent communities through local participation in management 
and benefit sharing, and the plantations’ efforts to build good 
relationship with adjacent local people. The findings also 
indicate that the extent of benefits received and the degree of 
participation used are associated with the negative/positive 
attitudes toward the study areas. This article concludes that 
for local people to support conservation efforts and resist 
illegal activities, the park should allow meaningful local par-
ticipation in park management and equitable sharing in the 
park's benefits.
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Notes
1. An agroforestry system in which short-term food crops are 
grown in the early years of timber plantations to satisfy the 
farmer’s quest for arable land, control weeds, reduce establish-
ment costs, generate early income, and stimulate the develop-
ment of woody perennial species (Agyeman et al., 2003).
2. Is a group of people presently elected and appointed to run, 
manage, and execute the State’s programs and policies, and 
their specific agencies and powers.
3. Is a motivation strategy, as large-scale farmers pay 11 to 17 
US$/day, while the plantation only pays 2.5 US$/day during 
tree planting exercises (1 US$ = 1,500 TZS, June 2011).
4. 20 plots × 20 sacks/plot = 400sacks. A sack contains 100 to 
120 kg, sold for about 0.7 US$/kg.
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